Consciousness, normativity, and intrinsicmeaning in large language models

Abstract

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs), together with renewed speculation about artificial consciousness, have intensified debates concerning meaning and semantic intentionality in artificial systems. This paper advances a restricted and conditional thesis: even if LLMs were to possess some form of consciousness, this would not suffice to establish intrinsic semantic intentionality. To clarify this claim, I introduce a hieroglyph-copying thought experiment showing that consciousness, even when accompanied by goal-directed or procedural intentionality, does not guarantee normatively assessable semantic content. Drawing on this result, I argue that contemporary LLM architectures—despite their ability to generate contextually appropriate linguistic outputs—operate through probabilistic optimization processes that do not by themselves ground epistemic commitment or truth-directed representation. The argument does not deny the sophistication of LLM representations nor attempt to resolve competing theories of meaning. Rather, it isolates and defends an insufficiency thesis: consciousness alone does not ground intrinsic semantics. The apparent meaningfulness of LLM outputs is therefore best understood as dependent on human interpretive projection rather than as an internally grounded semantic achievement.