Mechanisms ‘all the way down’?

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Ioan Muntean

Abstract

Book review: Mechanistic Explanations in Physics and Beyond, Brigitte Falkenburg and Gregor Schiemann, editors, European Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 11, Springer International Publishing, Cham 2019, pp.220

Article Details

How to Cite
Muntean, I. (2024). Mechanisms ‘all the way down’?. Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce), (74), 302–316. https://doi.org/10.59203/zfn.74.691
Section
Book reviews

References

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