“Internal” Problems of Normative Theories of Thinking and Reasoning
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Aug 22, 2016
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Abstract
This paper provides moderate criticism of so-called normative theories of thinking and reasoning. The discussion focuses on the problems of idealization, adequacy, inconsistent yet non-trivial logics, logical omniscience etc. I called them “internal” to the normative approach, because they stem from the very properties of formal systems used to model these two human activities. Some arguments, however, refer to the current theories in cognitive science, including those which are developed within “descriptive” framework.
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Urbańczyk, P. (2016). “Internal” Problems of Normative Theories of Thinking and Reasoning. Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce), (60), 35–52. Retrieved from https://zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/article/view/366
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References
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Priest, G., 1998. What so bad about contradictions? The Journal of Philosophy, 9, pp. 410–426.
Segerberg, K., 1999. Two traditions in the logic of belief: Bringing them together. In: H. Ohlbach, U. Reyle (Eds.), Logic, language and reasoning. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M., 2012. Normative systems: Logic, probability and rational choice. In: K.J. Holyoak, R.G. Morrison (Eds.), The oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cherniak, C., 1984. Computational complexity and the universal acceptance of logic. Journal of Philosophy, 81, pp. 739–758.
Christensen, D., 2004. Putting logic in its place: Formal constraints on rational belief. New York: Oxford University Press.
da Costa, N., French, S., 1990. Belief, contradiction and the logic of self-deception. American Philosophical Quarterly, 3, pp. 179–197.
Harman, G. (Ed.), 1986. Change in view. Principles of reasoning. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. 2010. Mental models and human reasoning. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, no 43, pp. 18243–18250.
Johnson-Laird, P.N., 2009. Mental logic, mental models, and simulations of human deductive reasoning. In: R. Sun (Ed.), The cambridge handbook of computational psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lenzen, W., 1978. Recent work in epistemic logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 30, pp. 1–219.
Łukasiewicz, J., 1971. On the principle of contradiction in Aristotle. The Review of Metaphysics, 24, pp. 485–509.
Priest, G., 1998. What so bad about contradictions? The Journal of Philosophy, 9, pp. 410–426.
Segerberg, K., 1999. Two traditions in the logic of belief: Bringing them together. In: H. Ohlbach, U. Reyle (Eds.), Logic, language and reasoning. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.