Induction, deduction and mammoth trails

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Mieszko Tałasiewicz


The paper examines various instances of 'inductionism-deductionism' controversion (e.g. Popper vs Vienna Circle or the formulation of Laudan's argument against realism as pessimistic meta-induction vs. kind of deduction). The thesis is that the form of logical reconstruction of our reasoning (in every-day life as well as in science or meta-science) as induction or deduction is irrelevant as to the rational evaluation of this reasoning. Thus the inductionism-deductionism controversion is claimed vacuous. Instead of formal logic a sort of evolutionary epistemology is called for adequate account, since - as it is argued for - the degree of sensitivity to counterexamples contradicting our theories and hypotheses is a kind of adaptation to environment.

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How to Cite
Tałasiewicz, M. (2007). Induction, deduction and mammoth trails. Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce), (40), 3–11. Retrieved from


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