Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)
type: channel
description: Philosophical Problems in Science (Polish: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce, abbrev. ZFN) is the oldest Polish journal dedicated to the philosophy in science. ZFN covers a wide range of topics of general interest to those working on philosophical problems involved in and intertwined with modern science (see Focus and Scope). ZFN has originated from a long tradition of Krakow philosophy of nature dating back to the second half of the nineteenth century (see Journal History). The journal policy is to continue the tradition of mutual discussion between philosophers and scientists.
publisher: Copernicus Center Press
language: en
publication name: Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)
issn: 0867-8286
items: Upholding human dignity in AI: Advocating moral reasoning over consensus ethics for value alignment
items: Homeostasis as a foundation for adaptive and emotional artificial intelligence
items: From a nitty-gritty debate within economics into the deep waters of philosophy of science. Introduction to the special issue of ZFN
items: At the interface of theory and experience
items: Explaining the undecidability of first-order logic
items: Orientation in the environment like perceiving affordances? Andrzej Lewicki’s account of cognition
items: Mechanisms ‘all the way down’?
items: The nature and norms of scientific explanation: Some preliminaries
items: Philosophy in the context of physics and cosmology: Leszek M. Sokołowski’s philosophical views
items: Are there really any errors in the Austrian theory of welfare?
items: From philosophy in science to information in nature: Michael Heller’s ideas
items: How science tracks understanding
items: The role of phronesis in Knowledge-Based Economy
items: The interdisciplinary profile of theology—fashion or necessity?
items: Ludwig Lachmann: A subjectivist institutionalist, but not a nihilist
items: Philosophy in technology: A research program
items: On the philosophy and logic of human action: A Neo-Austrian contribution to the methodology of the social sciences
items: What Rothbard could have done but did not do: The merits of Austrian economics without extreme apriorism
items: A praxeology of the value of life. A critique of Rothbard’s argument
items: Model uncertainty: When modeling risk leads to a pretense of knowledge
items: A defense of Austrian welfare economics
items: The ontic-epistemic debates of explanation revisited: The three-dimensional approach
items: Monarchy as private property government. A chiefly methodological critique
items: Taxation and the philosophy of Frédéric Bastiat
items: For the sake of simplicity: Applying software design parsimony to the content of information system ontologies
items: Free market, blackmail, and Austro-libertarianism
items: Ontic or epistemic conception of explanation: A misleading distinction?
items: Exploring the epistemic and ontic conceptions of Models and Idealizations in Science
items: The concept of structural information and possible applications
items: A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation

Upholding human dignity in AI: Advocating moral reasoning over consensus ethics for value alignment
type: item
description: Artificial intelligence (AI) offers transformative advancements across sectors such as healthcare, agriculture, and environmental sustainability. However, a pressing ethical challenge remains: aligning AI systems with human values in a manner that is stable, coherent, and universally applicable. As AI increasingly mediates human perception, shapes social interactions, and influences decision-making, it raises profound ethical concerns about its impact on human dignity and social well-being. The prevailing consensus-based approach, advocated by figures such as Google DeepMind’s Iason Gabriel, suggests that AI ethics should reflect majority societal or political viewpoints. While this model offers flexibility, it also risks moral relativism and ethical instability as social norms fluctuate. This paper argues that consensus-based ethics are inadequate for safeguarding fundamental values—especially human dignity—which should not be subject to shifting public opinion. Instead, it advocates for a moral framework that transcends cultural and political trends, providing a stable foundation for AI ethics. Through case studies like social media recommendation algorithms that exploit users’ vulnerabilities, particularly those of children and teenagers, the paper highlights the risks of AI systems driven by profit-oriented metrics without ethical oversight. Drawing on insights from moral philosophy and theology, particularly the works of Joseph Ratzinger, it contends that aligning AI with moral reasoning is essential to uphold human dignity, prevent texploitation, and promote the common good.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: AI ethics
  topic: keywords
subject: human dignity
  topic: keywords
subject: value alignment
  topic: keywords
subject: moral reasoning
  topic: keywords
subject: consensus ethics
  topic: keywords
creator: Octavian-Mihai Machidon
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 25
ending page: 39
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.707

Homeostasis as a foundation for adaptive and emotional artificial intelligence
type: item
description: Homeostasis, a fundamental biological mechanism, enables living organisms to maintain internal balance despite changing environmental conditions. Inspired by these adaptive processes, research into artificial intelligence (AI) seeks to develop systems capable of dynamic adaptation, introspection, and empathetic interactions with users. This article explores the potential of implementing homeostatic mechanisms in AI as a foundation for emotional intelligence and self-regulation. Key questions include the distinction between simulation and actual experience, the role of machine introspection, and the emergence of qualitative states akin to phenomenal experiences. Drawing on Antonio Damasio’s theory and classical concepts from cybernetics, the article investigates how homeostatic principles might inspire the development of AI, paving the way for more flexible and context-aware technologies.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: homeostasis
  topic: keywords
subject: artificial intelligence
  topic: keywords
subject: adaptive systems
  topic: keywords
subject: empathy
  topic: keywords
subject: self-regulation
  topic: keywords
subject: introspection
  topic: keywords
subject: machine introspection
  topic: keywords
subject: Antonio Damasio
  topic: keywords
subject: emotional intelligence
  topic: keywords
subject: cybernetics
  topic: keywords
creator: Anna Sarosiek
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 41
ending page: 54
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.706

From a nitty-gritty debate within economics into the deep waters of philosophy of science. Introduction to the special issue of ZFN
type: item
description: It all started in 2021 when we sparked a rather specific debate within Austrian economics in Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) – traditionally abbreviated as ZFN. The story unfolded as follows. First, Wysocki submitted a paper on the concept of indifference, as it is normally understood in the Austrian school of economics. To his astonishment and great relief, this then rising journal (now the one with well-established reputation, its Scopus ranking being as high as Q2 under the rubric of philosophy) accepted the submission in question and published it promptly in ZFN 71 as (Wysocki, 2021). It was an honour and a privilege, especially given the fact that Austrian economics – with all due respect to its scientific achievements – is nowadays not a mainstream economic current, to say the least. Hence, being published in ZFN only added to the strength of Wysocki’s belief that the journal is clearly unbiased towards any sort of philosophy of science. The very fact that Wysocki published a paper on indifference in Austrian economics and the fact that he spread the news about ZFN being also open to publishing maverick (after all, as already observed, Austrian economics is not a branch of mainstream economics) papers related to philosophy of science prompted Walter Block (a prominent Austrian economist) to submit to ZFN his rejoinder to Wysocki’s original paper on indifference, with the said response being ultimately published in ZFN 72 as (Block, 2022).
subject: Editorial
  topic: section
subject: philosophy
  topic: keywords
subject: economics
  topic: keywords
creator: Walter Block
creator: Igor Wysocki
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 7
ending page: 15
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.704

At the interface of theory and experience
type: item
description: The founding motto of philosophy in science is “tracking down big philosophical problems in contemporary science.” Knowing the basic history of philosophy and the history of science, we more or less know what “big philosophical topics” mean. The most representative topics of this kind include: time, space, causality, matter, life, consciousness, thinking... The tables of contents of philosophy textbooks could be copied to continue this list. These topics are big not only when they remain at a high level of generality, but also when they get down to special cases and particular sub-problems. Sometimes it is only then that they fully reveal their big format.
subject: Editorial
  topic: section
subject: philosophy
  topic: keywords
subject: science
  topic: keywords
subject: philosophy in science
  topic: keywords
creator: Michał Heller
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 9
ending page: 12
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.698

Explaining the undecidability of first-order logic
type: item
description: Turing proved the unsolvability of the decision problem for first-order logic (Entscheidungsproblem) in his famous paper On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. From this proof it follows that attempts to specify a solution for the Entscheidungsproblem through pattern detection in automated theorem proving (ATP) must fail. Turing’s proof, however, merely predicts the non-existence of such solutions; it does not construct concrete examples that explain why specific attempts to solve the decision problem by pattern detection fail. ATP-search often runs in infinite loops in the case of unprovable, i.e. not refutable, formulas and one can ask why finite patterns of repeated inference steps cannot serve as criteria for unprovability. We answer this question by constructing pairs of formulas (ϕ,ϕ′) such that ϕ is provable (refutable) and ϕ′ is unprovable (satisfiable in an infinite domain) but all but the last proof step of the ATP-search for ϕ is a proper part of the endless ATP-search for ϕ′. We generate such pairs of formulas by mimicking computable sequences for a certain kind of universal Turing machine, namely, splitting Turing machines (STMs), via sequences of inference steps in ATP. In contrast to Turing’s and the textbooks’ method to formalize Turing machines, our method does not rely on further axioms and allows us to transfer the straightforward insight that the halting problem cannot be solved through pattern detection to the case of the Entscheidungsproblem. Our method is a constructive alternative to general undecidability proofs that explains why a scientific problem, namely the Entscheidungsproblem, is unsolvable in a specific way. This explanation provides a better understanding of the failure of pattern detection, which is of interest to: (i) the programmer, who is concerned with prospects and limits of pattern detection, (ii) the logician, who is interested in identifying logical properties by properties of an ideal notat…
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: constructive proof
  topic: keywords
subject: automated theorem proving
  topic: keywords
subject: Entscheidungsproblem
  topic: keywords
subject: pattern detection
  topic: keywords
subject: halting problem
  topic: keywords
creator: Timm Lampert
creator: Anderson Nakano
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 3
ending page: 23
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.694

Orientation in the environment like perceiving affordances? Andrzej Lewicki’s account of cognition
type: item
description: The purpose of this article is to present Andrzej Lewicki’s account of cognition as orientation in the environment, comparing it with James J. Gibson’s ecological psychology. To do so, we conduct a comparative analysis of the former’s theory of indicators and the latter’s theory of affordance. The theoretical frame for our study is cognitive ecology, a research tradition characteristic of various studies of cognition, including contemporary ones. This allows us to show that, despite differences in the backgrounds and methodologies of these researchers, Lewicki can be considered one of the pioneers of contemporary ecological trends in cognitive science, although his influence has not been as widespread as that of Gibson. Our analysis proceeds in several steps. We begin with an overview of the biographies, backgrounds, and interests of the two researchers, as well as a brief introduction to cognitive ecology and related terms. Next, we discuss action/value indicators theory and affordances theory. We then compare Lewicki’s and Gibson’s approaches in more detail in terms of their use of similar research heuristics. The article ends with conclusions that go beyond historical issues.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: affordance
  topic: keywords
subject: cognitive ecology
  topic: keywords
subject: ecological psychology
  topic: keywords
subject: indicator of action
  topic: keywords
subject: indicator of value
  topic: keywords
subject: methodological individualism
  topic: keywords
subject: orientation in the environment
  topic: keywords
subject: tendency of the organism
  topic: keywords
creator: Michał Piekarski
creator: Witold Wachowski
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 71
ending page: 89
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.693

Mechanisms ‘all the way down’?
type: item
description: Book review: Mechanistic Explanations in Physics and Beyond, Brigitte Falkenburg and Gregor Schiemann, editors, European Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 11, Springer International Publishing, Cham 2019, pp.220
subject: Book reviews
  topic: section
creator: Ioan Muntean
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 302
ending page: 316
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.691

The nature and norms of scientific explanation: Some preliminaries
type: item
description: There are at least two deep and related debates about explanation: about its nature and about its norms. The aim of this special issue of Philosophical Problems in Science/Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce (ZFN) is to survey whether or not a consensus is at hand in these debates and to help settle what it can. The overarching foci are twofold: (i) the nature of scientific explanation, with special attention to the debate between ontic and epistemic conception of explanation, and (ii) the norms of scientific explanation, with special attention to so-called ‘ontic’ (or better, ‘alethic’) norms like truth and referential success and epistemic norms like intelligibility and idealized understanding. It called for advocates of various conceptions to articulate the current state of these debates. Researchers and scholars from around the globe—including Poland, Canada, Korea, The Netherlands, the United States, Greece, Austria, and Belgium—contributed. The special issue also attempts to provide an opening for new work on the norms of explanation, such as truth or model-based accuracy, information compression, abstraction, and generalization.
subject: Editorial
  topic: section
subject: scientific explanation
  topic: keywords
subject: ontic conception of explanation
  topic: keywords
subject: epistemic conception of explanation
  topic: keywords
subject: nature of explanation
  topic: keywords
subject: norms of explanation
  topic: keywords
creator: Abel Peña
creator: Cory Wright
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 5
ending page: 17
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.690

Philosophy in the context of physics and cosmology: Leszek M. Sokołowski’s philosophical views
type: item
description: The article attempts to reconstruct and analyze selected philosophical views of Leszek Sokołowski—a Krakow physicist and cosmologist who published many works dealing with issues on the border of science and philosophy (including metaphysics). An important aim of the article is also to place Sokołowski’s views in the context of the concept of “philosophy in science” (by M. Heller) and the phenomenon of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science. In this paper, I suggest that Sokołowski’s views fit into the philosophy initiated by Michał Heller, and Sokołowski himself can be considered a member of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: Leszek Sokołowski
  topic: keywords
subject: philosophy in science
  topic: keywords
subject: philosophy of nature
  topic: keywords
subject: philosophy of science
  topic: keywords
subject: history of Polish philosophy
  topic: keywords
creator: Kamil Piotr Trombik
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 55
ending page: 70
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.689

Are there really any errors in the Austrian theory of welfare?
type: item
description: This text reviews David Megger’s 2021 book entitled Justice in Welfare Economics. Libertarianism and the Austrian School (in Polish: Sprawiedliwość w ekonomii dobrobytu, liberatarianizm i szkoła austriacka). The review takes a critical approach, highlighting the most significant aspects of the presented considerations and emphasising their uniqueness and complexity. I intend to extensively discuss the author’s theses concerning the modification of the fundamental claims of Austrian school representatives about justice and welfare, highlighting both their strengths and weaknesses.
subject: Review essays
  topic: section
subject: Austrian School of Economics
  topic: keywords
subject: libertarianism
  topic: keywords
subject: welfare economics
  topic: keywords
creator: Mateusz Czyżniewski
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 505
ending page: 527
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.687

From philosophy in science to information in nature: Michael Heller’s ideas
type: item
description: This paper discusses the concept of information formulated by Michael (Michał) Heller. Heller—a philosopher, theoretical physicist, cosmologist, and theologian—provided a complex image of information and its role in nature, which is rarely found in studies of information. Heller posited that the laws of nature may be interpreted as information, or as providing information, presenting this as a complementary view to scientific structuralism (not discussed in this paper). According to Heller, the informational content of a structure in nature is inversely proportional to that structure’s degree of freedom. The more constrained or complex a structure is, and the less likely it is to exist, the more information it contains. In Heller’s view, the concept of information in Shannon’s Theory of Communication (ToC) is inadequate for expressing the notion of information beyond a numerical measure of a signal structure. Information in Heller’s research closely aligns with the concepts of Jacquette’s and Perzanowski’s combinatorial ontology (concepts not discussed in this paper) and the general theory of information (GTI) of Mark Burgin, although Heller did not explicitly make these connections.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: natural information
  topic: keywords
subject: physical information
  topic: keywords
subject: information in nature
  topic: keywords
subject: information in cosmology
  topic: keywords
subject: Michał Heller
  topic: keywords
subject: Mark Burgin
  topic: keywords
creator: Roman Krzanowski
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 83
ending page: 105
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.680

How science tracks understanding
type: item
description: This review article discusses the book Understanding How Science Explains the World by Kevin McCain, published by Cambridge University Press (2022). With an impressive combination of clarity and depth, McCain provides the reader with a firm grasp of how science works, of what science aims to achieve, and of what makes science a successful epistemic enterprise. The review article reconstructs the book’s overall dialectic and identifies one potential point of tension which concerns the role of truth or accuracy in scientific knowledge.
subject: Book reviews
  topic: section
subject: Truth
  topic: keywords
subject: scientific realism
  topic: keywords
subject: understanding
  topic: keywords
subject: Explanation
  topic: keywords
subject: scientific knowledge
  topic: keywords
creator: Federica Isabella Malfatti
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 317
ending page: 320
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.685

The role of phronesis in Knowledge-Based Economy
type: item
description: The aim of this paper is to reflect on contemporary understanding of “knowledge” within the Knowledge-Based Economy. Since the pursuit of knowledge has been a longstanding focus of European culture since Greek philosophy, we employ the original ancient terminology. Applying the hermeneutics of ancient texts along with critical and comparative analysis can aid in differentiating between “knowledge” and “wisdom”, often linked in modern theories, while also connecting this issue to the Aristotelian concept of phronesis. The authors argue that since human relations impact social (and so—economic) spheres, the issue of phronesis, a relational type of knowledge, should not go unexamined. The idea that application of knowledge (rather than its mere acquisition), crucial for the Knowledge-Based Economy, was embedded in the Greek term oikonomiké, which provides a basis for considering oneself a phronimos. Our aim is to demonstrate the value of phronesis particularly in the fields of management and the philosophical foundations of economics, as the skills encompassed within it have the potential to aid in educating not only a “sage” but also an active member of the community, capable of acting in a manner that benefits both themselves and the society.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: wisdom
  topic: keywords
subject: knowledge
  topic: keywords
subject: knowledge-based economy
  topic: keywords
subject: phronesis
  topic: keywords
subject: Aristotle
  topic: keywords
subject: prudence
  topic: keywords
subject: entrepreneurship
  topic: keywords
creator: Anna Ceglarska
creator: Katarzyna Cymbranowicz
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 257
ending page: 296
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.667

The interdisciplinary profile of theology—fashion or necessity?
type: item
description: This review pertains to the book Evolutionary Theology (Teologia ewolucyjna) written by Wojciech P. Grygiel and Damian Wąsek. The book presents a distinct and modern viewpoint on theology by offering a comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of theological language and utilizing it to reevaluate certain theological beliefs, such as the concept of original sin, within the framework of the ever-changing understanding of the Universe. This approach contributes significantly to the restoration of theology’s credibility in modern culture by bridging the gap between science and theology.
subject: Review essays
  topic: section
subject: evolutionary theology
  topic: keywords
subject: interdisciplinarity
  topic: keywords
subject: science and theology
  topic: keywords
creator: Andrzej Anderwald
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 259
ending page: 267
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.684

Ludwig Lachmann: A subjectivist institutionalist, but not a nihilist
type: item
description: The legacy of Ludwig Lachmann within the Austrian School of Economics is subject to several interpretations in the literature: though he clearly considered himself a member of the school and he influenced many Austrian economists, his particular methodological claims prompted Murray Rothbard to disavow him as a nihilist. In this article, we defend Lachmann by arguing that in order to defend his methodological stance he invoked extra-Austrian influences (Max Weber, G.L.S. Shackle). This way, he championed subjectivist institutionalism consistently both in theory and in practice. His approach leaves a peculiar, unorthodox, yet positive legacy for contemporary Austrian economics, not so far from the orthodox Misesian stance as it is broadly understood.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: subjectivism
  topic: keywords
subject: institutionalism
  topic: keywords
subject: methodology of economics
  topic: keywords
subject: financial markets
  topic: keywords
subject: Austrian School of Economics
  topic: keywords
subject: Ludwig Lachmann
  topic: keywords
creator: Krzysztof Turowski
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 205
ending page: 256
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.674

Philosophy in technology: A research program
type: item
description: Philosophy in technology is a research program that studies the philosophical roots of engineering and technology. Technologists, by virtue of their education, believe that the limits, goals, possibilities, and effects of technology on society and humankind are exclusively technological problems, hence their solutions must lie exclusively in technology. In contrast, philosophy in technology asserts that the resolutions to these problems need to be rooted in an understanding of their philosophical origins. This program paper defines the objectives of philosophy in technology, the kinds of questions it explores, the methods it uses, and how it differs from the philosophy of technology.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: philosophy in technology
  topic: keywords
subject: philosophy of technology
  topic: keywords
subject: engineering perspective
  topic: keywords
subject: semantic gap
  topic: keywords
subject: philosophy in science
  topic: keywords
subject: theology
  topic: keywords
creator: Paweł Polak
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 59
ending page: 81
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.682

On the philosophy and logic of human action: A Neo-Austrian contribution to the methodology of the social sciences
type: item
description: Philosophical action theory seems to be in pretty good shape. The same may not be true for the study of human action in economics. Famous is the rant that the study of human action in economics gives reason to tremble for the reputation of the subject. But how does this come about? Since economic action is about action, the broader study must surely have a strong impact on the more specific field. The paper sets out, from the ground up, how an essential concept in economic theory–the concept of competition–can fundamentally benefit from insights derived exclusively from analytical action theory broadly conceived. In doing so, the paper delivers on an old Austrian promise: it is sometimes claimed that Austrian economists understand competition better than most economists. This may be a bold claim, since Austrian economists have neither traced the understanding of subjectivity to its very origin (the theory of intentionality), nor have they traced their sympathy for methodological individualism in relation to market processes to its very ground (the theory of (human) action). This paper aims to fill this gap. Moreover, by grounding an Austrian view of competition in analytic action theory, it succeeds in avoiding the serious problems of the dominant equilibrium approach. By explaining competition as rivalry, the paper draws on the philosophy and logic of human action to bring the (economic) agent back into play. In this way, a case is made for an integrated view of Austrian theory as an amalgam of Austrian economics and analytic action theory.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: competition
  topic: keywords
subject: rivalry
  topic: keywords
subject: equilibrium theory
  topic: keywords
subject: action theory
  topic: keywords
subject: subjectivism
  topic: keywords
subject: Ludwig von Mises
  topic: keywords
creator: Michael Oliva Cordoba
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 107
ending page: 150
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.681

What Rothbard could have done but did not do: The merits of Austrian economics without extreme apriorism
type: item
description: Austrian economics emphasizes a priori components of social scientific theory. Most emphatically, Ludwig Mises and Murray Rothbard champion praxeology, a methodology often criticized as extremely aprioristic. Among the numerous justifications and interpretations of praxeology to be found in the primary and secondary literature, conventionalism avoids the charge of extreme apriorism by construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic instead of synthetic. This paper (1) explicates the tentative structure of the fundamental axiom, (2) clarifies some aspects of a conventionalist defense of praxeology, and (3) appraises conventionalist praxeology according to Rothbardian criteria. While Rothbard provides an essentialist justification of praxeology and embraces extreme apriorism, a mildly aprioristic conventionalist defense of praxeology fares better on Rothbard’s own criteria and is much more compatible with other contemporary methodological positions and economic theories.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: Austrian economics
  topic: keywords
subject: praxeology
  topic: keywords
subject: conventionalism
  topic: keywords
subject: apriorism
  topic: keywords
subject: analyticity
  topic: keywords
subject: Ludwig Mises
  topic: keywords
subject: Murray N. Rothbard
  topic: keywords
creator: Alexander Linsbichler
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 43
ending page: 84
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.678

A praxeology of the value of life. A critique of Rothbard’s argument
type: item
description: The present paper aims to study the issue of the value of life in Murray N. Rothbard’s work, and to examine his argument for the contention that “life should be an objective ultimate value” and that “the preservation and furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom.” Rothbard’s assumptions and presuppositions are investigated and critically assessed. Using conceptual and logical analysis rooted mostly in the praxeological method of economics (as developed by Mises and Rothbard himself) and the theory of value (Scheffler, Raz, Elzenberg), it is demonstrated that Rothbard’s account is fallacious both on its own as well as on broader theoretical grounds. It is argued that what Rothbard could—under his specific assumptions about valuing—correctly claim is only that an actor values life to some extent, rather than that life has an objective ultimate value or preservation and furtherance of one’s life has an axiomatic status. The theoretical argument is supported by empirical illustration from suicide terrorism. The paper submits that Rothbard’s position on the value of life is unsound, and that using his argumentation as it stands cannot succeed.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: praxeology
  topic: keywords
subject: time preference
  topic: keywords
subject: Murray Newton Rothbard
  topic: keywords
subject: valuing
  topic: keywords
subject: value of life
  topic: keywords
subject: libertarianism
  topic: keywords
creator: Paweł Nowakowski
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 425
ending page: 456
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.671

Model uncertainty: When modeling risk leads to a pretense of knowledge
type: item
description: The main purpose of the paper is to develop a concept of model uncertainty as opposed to the existing and well-established concept of model risk. Up to date the broad literature on probability not only developed complete probability systems, but also correctly noticed limitations of probability calculus. Despite the acknowledgement of such probability restrictions, drawbacks of modeling are often related to model risk. We present an argument here to distinguish a feature limiting models even further: model uncertainty. The tenets of it already exist in the literature on probability, but were not properly emphasized while the idea of model risk was developed. Our plan it to start with a broad overview of the existing knowledge about probability in order to start with fundamental principles. From them we are deriving a new concept of model uncertainty.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: uncertainty
  topic: keywords
subject: Frank Knight
  topic: keywords
subject: model risk
  topic: keywords
subject: model uncertainty
  topic: keywords
creator: Mateusz Machaj
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 151
ending page: 175
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.679

A defense of Austrian welfare economics
type: item
description: Murray N. Rothbard’s Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics is the defining contribution outlining the Austrian school’s approach to welfare theory. A recent attack on this approach is by Wysocki and Dominiak (2023), who argue, contra Rothbard, that whether an exchange is welfare-enhancing is not necessarily related to whether that exchange is just, and therefore the Rothbardian framework is wrong. This paper shows that their argument misconceives how Austrians treat the concept of welfare. They also misunderstand the crucial role of the principle of demonstrated preference. Properly conceived, Rothbard’s reconstruction remains intact.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: welfare economics
  topic: keywords
subject: Austrian economic
  topic: keywords
subject: Murray N. Rothbard
  topic: keywords
creator: Tate Fegley
creator: Karl-Friedrich Israel
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 19
ending page: 42
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.677

The ontic-epistemic debates of explanation revisited: The three-dimensional approach
type: item
description: After Wesley Salmon’s causal-mechanical stance on explanation in the 1980s, the ontic-epistemic debate of scientific explanations appeared to be resolved in the philosophy of science. However, since the twenty-first century, this debate has been rekindled among philosophers who focus on mechanistic explanations. Nevertheless, its issues have evolved, necessitating scrutiny of the new trends in this debate and a comparison with the original controversy between Carl Hempel and Salmon. The primary objective of this paper is to elucidate three categorical dimensions in the ontic-epistemic debates, spanning from the original to the recent controversies. Subsequently, it will explore why the conception of explanation is linked to representations, what conditions are necessary for linguistic expressions to be explanatory, and what roles norms play in explanation. Consequently, contrary to the common stereotype, it will be argued that mechanistic explanations are more likely to be epistemic rather than ontic.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: mechanistic explanation
  topic: keywords
subject: scientific representation
  topic: keywords
subject: explanatory norms
  topic: keywords
subject: Wesley Salmon
  topic: keywords
creator: Jinyeong Gim
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 99
ending page: 169
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.675

Monarchy as private property government. A chiefly methodological critique
type: item
description: Hans-Hermann Hoppe famously argued that monarchy is superior to democracy insofar as property rights protection is concerned. The present paper calls this claim into question, with much of the heavy lifting being done by methodological ponderings. More specifically, it is demonstrated that instead of a priori, praxeological truths, Hoppe’s monarchy theory offers an ideal type of the politician bestowed with an inheritable title to the throne. Against this background, the ideal type in question is shown to be faulty in that it treats monarchs as capitalist landowners of sorts, thereby overlooking strictly political incentives they face, which can predictably push them in directions inimical to free markets.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: praxeology
  topic: keywords
subject: sociology
  topic: keywords
subject: Austrian methodology
  topic: keywords
subject: time preference
  topic: keywords
subject: ideal type
  topic: keywords
subject: apriorism
  topic: keywords
subject: Hans-Hermann Hoppe
  topic: keywords
creator: Norbert Slenzok
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 359
ending page: 389
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.669

Taxation and the philosophy of Frédéric Bastiat
type: item
description: Frederic Bastiat (1801-1850) was an economist and journalist. A member of the French Liberal School, he is best known for his free trade ideas and his philosophy of law. Mark Blaug ranks him as one of the 100 greatest economists before Keynes. Schumpeter called him a brilliant economic journalist. Haney devoted a chapter of his History of Economic Thought to Bastiat. Although Bastiat is known for his work on free trade and the philosophy of law, he also wrote on other topics. To date, almost no one has examined his views on taxation. The purpose of this paper is to fill that gap in the literature.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: taxation
  topic: keywords
subject: utilitarian
  topic: keywords
subject: rights theory
  topic: keywords
subject: public finance
  topic: keywords
subject: French liberalism
  topic: keywords
subject: Frédéric Bastiat
  topic: keywords
creator: Robert McGee
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 177
ending page: 203
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.668

For the sake of simplicity: Applying software design parsimony to the content of information system ontologies
type: item
description: Although many information system ontologies (ISOs) claim to be parsimonious, the notion of parsimony seems to influence the debate on ISOs only at the level of vague and uncritical assumption. To challenge this trend, the paper aims to clarify what it means for ISOs to be parsimonious. Specifically, section 2 shows that parsimony in computer science generally concerns software design and, together with elegance, is one of the two aspects of the broader notion of simplicity. Section 3 transforms the main claims of parsimony in software design into claims about the content of ISOs, the combination of which is hereafter called “parsimony of content”—where “content” refers only to the content of ISOs. Sections 4-7 discuss the application of this parsimony to the design of ISOs, and outline different kinds (and combinations) of parsimony of content. Finally, section 8 considers whether parsimony of content could provide some criteria both for selecting and/or classifying the contents of ISOs and for choosing between different and equally consistent ISOs.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: information system ontologies
  topic: keywords
subject: ontological aims
  topic: keywords
subject: parsimony
  topic: keywords
subject: representation primitives
  topic: keywords
subject: simplicity
  topic: keywords
creator: Timothy Tambassi
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 135
ending page: 155
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.635

Free market, blackmail, and Austro-libertarianism
type: item
description: In the present paper we examine the standard Austro-libertarian account of blackmail according to which blackmail should be legal as it does not coerce the blackmailee to part with his property and so cannot be subsumed under extortion. Against this account we put forth a preliminary argument or a hypothesis, if you will, that even if blackmail cannot be subsumed under extortion, it still does not follow that it should be legal, for it might be subsumed under fraud. Indeed, the hypothesis we would like to offer for consideration is that blackmail is fraud, at least under some circumstances. To wit, we claim that even if the blackmailer does not coerce the blackmailee, in cases in which the blackmailer does not have an intention to execute his otherwise legal threats, he nonetheless deceives the blackmailee, thereby inducing him to part with his property. This is fraud and it renders the blackmailee’s property transfer involuntary and invalid. As fraud should be illegal under Austro-libertarianism, so should blackmail.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: blackmail
  topic: keywords
subject: fraud
  topic: keywords
subject: coercion
  topic: keywords
subject: Austro-Libertarianism
  topic: keywords
subject: Walter Block
  topic: keywords
creator: Łukasz Dominiak
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 85
ending page: 106
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.660

Ontic or epistemic conception of explanation: A misleading distinction?
type: item
description: In this paper, I discuss the differences between ontic and epistemic conceptions of scientific explanation, mainly in relation to the so-called new mechanical philosophy. I emphasize that the debate on conceptions of scientific explanation owes much to Salmon’s ontic/epistemic distinction, although much has changed since his formulations. I focus on the interplay between ontic and epistemic norms and constraints in providing mechanistic explanations. My conceptual analysis serves two aims. Firstly, I formulate some suggestions for recognising that both sets of norms and constraints, ontic and epistemic, are necessary for scientific theorising. Secondly, I emphasize that there are multiple dimensions involved in scientific explanation, rather than clear-cut alternatives between ontic and epistemic aspects. I conclude with a general observation that although contextual aspects of explanations are unavoidable, the epistemic-relativity of our categories, explanations and models can in fact be compatible with their objectivity. Instead of making hastily drawn ontological implications from our theories or models, we should carefully scrutinize them from the ontic-epistemic perspective.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: new mechanical philosophy
  topic: keywords
subject: mechanistic explanation
  topic: keywords
subject: ontic
  topic: keywords
subject: epistemic
  topic: keywords
subject: explanatory norms
  topic: keywords
subject: explanatory constraints
  topic: keywords
creator: Michał Oleksowicz
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 259
ending page: 291
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.658

Exploring the epistemic and ontic conceptions of Models and Idealizations in Science
type: item
description: Book review: Alejandro Cassini & Juan Redmond (eds.), Models and Idealizations in Science: Artifactual and Fictional Approaches, Springer Iternational Publishing, Cham 2021, pp.xv+270.
subject: Book reviews
  topic: section
creator: Kristian Gonzalez Barman
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 295
ending page: 301
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.647

The concept of structural information and possible applications
type: item
description: In this paper, the concept of structural information is presented. The mathematical foundation of the concept is put forward, and the nature of information encoded in a structure is studied. A method for calculating the amount of structural information is introduced. An application to the analysis of cognitive maps is also presented and discussed.
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: information
  topic: keywords
subject: structure
  topic: keywords
subject: graph
  topic: keywords
subject: relation
  topic: keywords
subject: cognitive maps
  topic: keywords
creator: Andrzej Bielecki
creator: Ryszard Stocki
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 157
ending page: 183
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.654

A conventionalist account of distinctively mathematical explanation
type: item
description: Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic items (ontic objects, properties, structures, etc.) and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock, 2015; Povich, 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski, 2021).
subject: Articles
  topic: section
subject: scientific explanation
  topic: keywords
subject: philosophy of science
  topic: keywords
subject: philosophy of mathematics
  topic: keywords
subject: mathematical explanation
  topic: keywords
subject: ontic conception
  topic: keywords
subject: conventionalism
  topic: keywords
creator: Mark Povich
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 171
ending page: 223
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.648