TY - JOUR AU - TaƂasiewicz, Mieszko PY - 2007/06/07 Y2 - 2024/03/29 TI - Induction, deduction and mammoth trails JF - Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) JA - ZFN VL - 0 IS - 40 SE - Articles DO - UR - https://zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/article/view/280 SP - 3-11 AB - The paper examines various instances of 'inductionism-deductionism' controversion (e.g. Popper vs Vienna Circle or the formulation of Laudan's argument against realism as pessimistic meta-induction vs. kind of deduction). The thesis is that the form of logical reconstruction of our reasoning (in every-day life as well as in science or meta-science) as induction or deduction is irrelevant as to the rational evaluation of this reasoning. Thus the inductionism-deductionism controversion is claimed vacuous. Instead of formal logic a sort of evolutionary epistemology is called for adequate account, since - as it is argued for - the degree of sensitivity to counterexamples contradicting our theories and hypotheses is a kind of adaptation to environment. ER -