Eric Kandel’s intellectual framework for psychiatry and non-reductive materialism
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Nov 27, 2012
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Abstract
In this article I analyze Eric Kandel’s intellectual frameworks for psychiatry from the perspective of non-reductionist materialism. I briefly present Kandel’s program and its main features and then, after introducing various types of non-reductionist materialism, I focus on incorporation the philosophical view into a purely scientific program. The main goal of this paper is to show that a philosophical component is necessary for holistic approaches to the philosophy of mind.
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Janik, B. (2012). Eric Kandel’s intellectual framework for psychiatry and non-reductive materialism. Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce), (51), 76–95. Retrieved from https://zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/article/view/87
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References
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Lopez-Ibor, J. J., Gaebel, W., Maj, M., and Sartorius, N., (red.) (2002). Psychiatry as a Neuroscience. John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
Revonsuo, A. (2001). On the Nature of Explanation in the Neurosciences. [w:] Machamer, P.K., McLaughlin, P., Grush, R. (red.) Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.
Stephan, A. (2002) Emergentism, irreducibility, and downward causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 65:77-93
Broome, M., Bortolotti, L. (2009). Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: philosophical perspectives. OUP Oxford.
Davidson, D. (1970). Mental Events. [w:] Foster, L., Swanson, J. W. (red.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.
Ghaemi, S.N., McHugh, P.R. (2007). The concepts of psychiatry: A pluralistic approach to the mind and mental illness., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
Glas, G. (2002) Churchland, Kandel and Dooyeweerd on the reducibility of mind states., Philosophia Reformata, 67, s. 148-172.
Kandel, E.R. (2005) Psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and the new biology of mind. American Psychiatric Publications.
Kandel, E., Schwartz, J., Jessell, T., et al. (2000). Principles of neural science, volume 4. McGraw-Hill New York.
Kandel, E. (1999). Biology and the future of psychoanalysis: a new intellectual framework for psychiatry revisited. American Journal of Psychiatry, 156(4):505–524.
Kandel, E. et al. (1998). A new intellectual framework for psychiatry. American Journal of Psychiatry, 155(4):457–469.
Kay, J. (2006). Essentials of Psychiatry. Wiley.
Kim, J. (2002). Umysł w swiecie fizycznym. Esej na temat problemu umysłu i ciała oraz przyczynowania mentalnego. Wyd. IFiS Pan.
Lopez-Ibor, J. J., Gaebel, W., Maj, M., and Sartorius, N., (red.) (2002). Psychiatry as a Neuroscience. John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
Revonsuo, A. (2001). On the Nature of Explanation in the Neurosciences. [w:] Machamer, P.K., McLaughlin, P., Grush, R. (red.) Theory and Method in the Neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press.
Stephan, A. (2002) Emergentism, irreducibility, and downward causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 65:77-93